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Employment Law.  Colpitts v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc., 227 A.3d 996 
(R.I. 2020).  An employer is not required to have actual knowledge 
that an employee is under the influence, nor that the employee 
manifests the specific symptoms usually associated with being 
under the influence, to request that an employee adhere to a drug 
test.  To make such a request, an employer is only required to have 
reasonable grounds to believe that an employee is under the 
influence of a controlled substance. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On March 9, 2018, Michael Colpitts (Colpitts) filed a verified 
complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court against W.B. Mason 
alleging that on March 5, 2018, while making a delivery as a part 
of his work, Colpitts suffered an injury to his right hand.1  The 
complaint further alleged that Colpitts then returned to the 
worksite and reported the injury to his supervisor, Christopher 
Santos (Santos).2  Colpitts further alleged that W.B. Mason 
suspended and ultimately terminated his employment, in violation 
of Rhode Island General Law section 28-6.5-1, by wrongfully 
demanding that he submit to a drug test without reasonable 
grounds to believe that he was under the influence of any 
intoxicating liquors or controlled substances that might have 
impaired his ability to perform his job.3  On August 16, 2018, a 
consolidated hearing was held to address both Colpitts’s request for 
relief and the merits of the matter.4 
Colpitts testified that on the day in question, he was “unable to 
finish the day” due to “shooting and extreme pains.”5  Colpitts 
recounted that he returned to the job site and requested to leave to 




5. See id. at 999.
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obtain medical treatment.6  He stated that after ten to fifteen 
minutes, Santos returned with Mike Bonito (Bonito), the branch 
manager.7  Colpitts testified that he told Santos and Bonito that he 
was in “lots of pain.”8  Colpitts then testified that Bonito stated he 
believed Colpitts “might be impaired, and that [Santos and Bonito] 
want[ed] to get [Colpitts] tested.”9  With respect to the pain he 
experienced on the day in question, Colpitts testified that he “felt 
like he was going to throw up,” his back was “killing him,” and that 
he repeatedly bent over trying to find relief.10   
Colpitts stated that, on his way to a medical facility, he 
admitted to Santos that he used medical marijuana, and that he 
“couldn’t take a drug test because it would prove that he smoked 
marijuana,” and there was “no way ‘to prove that he did not smoke 
marijuana within a certain amount of time because it stays in your 
system.’”11  It was Colpitts’s position that he used marijuana 
therapeutically to treat disabilities resulting from injuries 
sustained while in the United States Army.12  Colpitts stated that 
although he applied for and received a medical marijuana card in 
Rhode Island, he never used marijuana “on the clock or on the job,” 
nor was he ever “under the effects of marijuana during the course 
of his employment.”13  Colpitts further testified that, once at the 
facility, he refused to take the drug test but submitted to a 
breathalyzer, the results of which came back negative.14  Colpitts 
then testified that, on March 8, 2018, Joanna Lowney (Lowney), 
W.B. Mason’s H.R. representative, notified him that he had 
“violated [W.B. Mason’s] fleet policy” so his employment had to be 
terminated.15  On cross-examination, Colpitts conceded that during 







12. See id. at 998–99.
13. See id. at 999.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 1000.
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at times, stated he might “puke because of heartburn,” and that he 
had forgotten to take his medication.16 
Santos testified that on March 5, 2018, Colpitts arrived at the 
warehouse unannounced and asked Santos to fill out an injury 
report.17  Santos testified that Colpitts was  “clenching over . . . 
[and] putting his hands on his knees.”18  Santos described Colpitts’s 
behavior as “weird.”19  Santos stated Colpitts’s description of the 
events was unclear and that Colpitts was “jumping all over the 
place.”20  Santos claimed that that due to his suspicions about 
Colpitts’s condition, he sought counsel from Lowney and Bonito.21  
Both parties agreed to request that Colpitts take a drug test.22 
Santos recounted that while Colpitts was informing Bonito of 
what happened, Colpitts excessively used the “F word” and was 
unable to clearly describe which hand was injured.23  Santos 
further testified that Colpitts was not making complete sentences, 
kept staggering back and forth, bending over, and repeating that 
he was “f***ed up” and that he needed to “catch his breath” and he 
was “going to puke.”24  Santos said that after asking Colpitts to 
submit to a drug test, Colpitts became agitated, said that he was 
fine and would go back to work.25  While in Santos’s car on the way 
to the medical facility, Colpitts then showed Santos his medical 
marijuana card, detailing that that was the reason he could not 
take a drug test.26 
Bonito stated that he was concerned over Colpitts’s behavior 
that day and described Colpitts’s explanation of events as 
“distorted.”27  Bonito elaborated that “what caught [him] off guard 








23. See id. at 1000.
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indicate you had hurt yourself.28  He further indicated that Colpitts 
was also abruptly swallowing and hunching over with his hands on 
his knees.29  Bonito claimed that Colpitts said that he was going to 
“puke” and felt that way when he forgot to take his medication.30  
Bonito also testified that he did not see any evidence of extreme 
pain and that after requesting Colpitts adhere to a drug test, 
Colpitts stated that he was fine and would return to work.31  On 
cross-examination, Bonito acknowledged that he noticed Colpitts’s 
eyes were dilated, but could not recall if his eyes were red.32 
On October 5, 2018, after the close of the trial, the trial judge 
rendered a bench decision, concluding that both Santos and Bonito 
had reasonable grounds to believe that Colpitts was under the 
influence of a controlled substance.33 On November 8, 2018, 
Colpitts’s request for a preliminary injunction was denied and 
judgement on the merits was entered in favor of W.B. Mason.34  
Colpitts appealed.35 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court began by noting the standard of review.36  The Court 
noted that the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a 
jury in a civil matter will not be disturbed unless those factual 
findings are “clearly erroneous.”37  The Court also applies a 
deferential standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact.38  
However, the Court reviews the trial justice’s conclusions on 
questions of law de novo.39 
Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the Court found that 
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and Bonito had reasonable grounds to believe that Colpitts was 
under the influence of a controlled substance, satisfying the 
standard set forth in section 28-6.5-1.40  The Court noted that some 
of Colpitts’s behavior was consistent with not only someone who 
was in extreme pain, but also with someone who was under the 
influence of a controlled substance.41  The Court found that Santos 
and Bonito had reasonable grounds to request a drug test, due to 
Colpitts bending over, stating that he had to puke, staggering, and 
repeated use of obscenities.42  Although Colpitts pointed out that 
odd behavior was not indicative of drug use, the Court reasoned 
that an employee’s behavior does not need to lead only to a 
conclusion that the employee is under the influence, nor does the 
employer need actual knowledge that the employee is definitely 
under the influence.43  The Court found that section 28-6.5-1 
requires only that there be reasonable grounds that the employee 
is under the influence of a controlled substance to request testing 
and that Colpitts’s ambiguous and odd behavior satisfied that 
bar.44 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty 
of arbitrarily drawing a line between what types of behavior are 
indicative of drug use, or rather of extreme pain.45  The Court was 
openly sympathetic to the physical condition of Colpitts, which 
resulted from his time served in the United States Army.46  
40. See id. at 1004; see also 28 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.5-1(a)(1) (providing
that “[e]mployers may require that an employee submit to a drug test if: [t]he 
employer has reasonable grounds to believe based on specific aspects of the 
employee’s job performance and specific contemporaneous documented obser-
vations, concerning the employee’s appearance, behavior or speech that the 
employee may be under the influence of a controlled substance, which may be 
impairing his or her ability to perform his or her job.”). 




45. Id. at 1005.
46. Id.
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However, the Court was clearly bound by the “reasonable grounds” 
standard set forth in section 28-6.5-1.47  
The Court took the initiative to provide some explanation as to 
why the standard to request an employee to submit to drug testing 
is so low.48  Employers and supervisors are not medical 
professionals and as such should not be expected to distinguish 
between symptoms of pain and symptoms of being under the 
influence.49  According to the Court, “there is no statutory 
requirement that an employer possess a degree of medical 
sophistication” to request that an employee submit to a drug test.50  
Through this reasoning, the Court noted that the standard to 
request that an employee take a drug test is low because raising the 
bar would effectively require that employers have some degree of 
medical sophistication in order to request drug testing.51  The Court 
recognized that the legislative intent of section 28-6.5-1 was to 
permit employers to request the testing based solely on 
contemporaneous observations, such as unusual appearance, 
behavior, or speech that may be indicative of drug use, so that a 
worker’s ability to perform their job is not impaired and the safety 
of all employees can be ensured.52 
Although the cause of Colpitts’s behavior was open to more 
than one interpretation, employers and the judicial system should 
not be required to decipher what is, or what is not, behavior 
definitively indicative of drug use.  The reasonable grounds 
standard prevents the courts from arbitrarily drawing lines that 
should be left to individuals with medical expertise.  It would be 
difficult to keep the workplace safe if the standard required an 
employer to have actual knowledge of an individual’s drug use 
before requesting that they to submit to a drug test. 
A secondary issue that arises in this case, as Colpitts points 
out, is the lack of technology currently available to precisely 






52. Id. at 1005.
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currently are, under the influence of marijuana.53  Colpitts 
submitted to a breathalyzer, which can tell if one is currently under 
the influence of alcohol, but refused to take a drug test because of 
current technology’s inability to accurately pinpoint the time of 
marijuana use.54  With the medical marijuana field growing every 
day, and the increase of its use by the public, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court will likely have to take the absence of such 
technology into consideration in cases involving employees who do 
submit to the drug testing, subsequently test positive for marijuana 
use, and then challenge employment termination. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that that the trial 
justice did not abuse her discretion because Colpitts’s incoherent 
and volatile behavior were reasonable grounds for an employer to 
believe that an employee was under the influence of a controlled 
substance, thus giving the employer the ability to request an 
employee to submit to drug testing.55  The Court determined that 
it was not a requirement of the statute for an employer to have a 
degree of medical sophistication in order to determine that an 
employee was definitely under the influence of a controlled 
substance prior to requesting testing.56 
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